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This article makes a case study of ‘flarfing’ (a creative Facebook user practice 
with roots in found-text poetry) in order to contribute to an understanding of 
the potentials and limitations facing users of online social networking sites 
who wish to address the issue of online hate speech. The practice of ‘flarfing’ 
involves users posting ‘blue text’ hyperlinked Facebook page names into 
status updates and comment threads. Facebook flarf sends a visible, though 
often non-literal, message to offenders and onlookers about what kinds of 
speech the responding activist(s) find (un)acceptable in online discussion, 
belonging to a category of agonistic online activism that repurposes the tools 
of internet trolling for activist ends. I argue this practice represents users 
attempting to ‘take responsibility’ for the culture of online spaces they inhabit, 
promoting intolerance to hate speech online. Careful consideration of the 
limits of flarf ’s efficacy within Facebook’s specific regulatory environment 
shows the extent to which this practice and similar responses to online hate 
speech are constrained by the platforms on which they exist. 
issue 23: General Issue 2014
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Introduction
A recent spate of high profile cases of online abuse has raised awareness of the amount, 
volume and regularity of abuse and hate speech that women and minorities routinely 
attract online. These range from the responses garnered by Anita Sarkeesian’s (2012; 
2014) video series ‘Tropes vs. Women in Video Games,’ which included photoshopped 
images of Sarkeesian made to appear bruised and brutalised, (Lewis, 2012) to the abuse 
directed at the activist Caroline Criado-Perez following her campaign to have a woman 
represented on a UK banknote (Guardian Staff, 2014), to the countless instances of more 
pernicious ‘Everyday Sexism’ documented by the activist group of the same name. 
As a result of these and a host of similar recent events, it has become increasingly 
apparent that online abuse and instances of hate speech directed at women, people of 
colour, transgender individuals and other minorities is on the rise in many online spaces. 
This awareness is so prevalent that Robinson Meyer (2014) writing for The Atlantic in 
late October 2014 described the GamerGate movement (an online hate mob responding 
to the increasing visibility of women in the games industry and in gaming culture, and 
a kind of culmination of these larger trends) as ‘an existential crisis for Twitter.’ This is 
particularly the case given that Twitter has become an important public space for users 
in not just the videogame industry but also similar ‘cultural communities that have strong 
online presences, including tech, science fiction, fantasy, comics, and film’ (Meyer, 2014). 
The mental and emotional burdens borne by the women and minorities that use these 
platforms are clearly disproportionate, as they expose themselves to almost limitless 
online abuse. While many users clearly feel that this situation is unacceptable and can no 
longer be ignored, the question remains, what can practicably be done about the problem 
of harassment and hate speech on social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter? 
In part, this problem is constituted by the approach taken by many social media sites, as 
they deliberately position their services in a very particular relationship with their users 
in order to limit the responsibilities they have towards them. Tarleton Gillespie (2010) has 
productively focused on the terminology of the ‘platform’ itself, frequently deployed by 
sites like Twitter and Facebook, arguing that it does important discursive work positioning 
these services and managing expectations across users, potential legislative regulators, 
and advertisers – eliding and diffusing the tensions that might otherwise arise from their 
competing interests. As Gillespie (2010: 11) notes:
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… online content providers who do not produce their own information have 
long sought to enjoy limited liability for that information, especially as the li-
abilities in question have expanded from sordid activities like child pornogra-
phy and insider trading to the much more widespread activities of music and 
movie piracy. 
Missing from this list of indemnities that platform holders regularly seek for themselves is 
the problem of hate speech generated on and transmitted through social media platforms. 
Many platforms simply do not want the burden (whether economic or legal) entailed by 
responsibility for dealing with hate speech, and their arguments against the imposition of 
further regulation often rest upon claims as to the ‘impossible’ scale of the problem. In a 
similar fashion, intervention by state authorities often faces a host of issues preventing or 
hampering effective regulation of online hate speech. These include cultural and legislative 
reluctance, as well as technical or practical difficulties facing enforcement and regulation 
of the internet, which many governments and state agencies are not well placed to handle. 
As a result of these issues, users of online services are often left to take responsibility 
for hate speech themselves. With this paper I explore one case of users acting creatively 
within Facebook’s technical and regulatory environment to take small-scale actions against 
hate speech. 
I begin by briefly considering the literature addressing questions of hate speech and 
the varying degrees of comfort different national traditions have with greater or lesser 
state intervention in speech. This provides important context for the later discussion 
of the practice of flarfing. Examining the literature around online hate speech reveals a 
complex negotiation between states, internet intermediaries, and the agency afforded to 
users themselves, with this paper taking a particular focus on the regulatory environment 
presented by Facebook. The remainder of this paper discusses a little-known creative 
activist strategy employed on Facebook which redeploys the site’s tagging algorithm to 
‘flarf ’ – posting absurdist, nonsense, or subtly reflexive messages to Facebook threads 
and status updates, often those containing bigotry, sexism or hate speech. I examine this 
practice in the context of the ongoing debate around internet hate, situating the case of 
Facebook flarf as a creative, discursive activist practice deployed by individuals and small 
communities as a user-led response to harmful speech online. I argue that it demonstrates 
the narrow utility of individual citizens’ creative small-scale interventions in online 
discourse, acknowledging that it is importantly limited in its ability to address the scope of 
the problem sufficiently, existing as it does within the limitations of the regulatory spaces 
both Facebook itself and larger international contexts define. 
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This paper adds to the evidence for what Banks (2010: 234) calls the need for ‘a broad 
coalition of citizens, government and businesses’ in addressing hate speech online, 
and provides a clearer picture of what kinds of creative responses may be and have 
been available to individual users in the interim. Users can be instrumental in taking 
responsibility for the promotion of online cultures intolerant of bigotry and hate speech 
on social media platforms, as Banks (2010: 238) suggests, but it is important to also 
acknowledge the limitations and opportunities created by the context of these platforms 
own regulatory responses.
The research undertaken for this paper was performed by observing Facebook user 
activities online over a period of years, though the majority of examples are drawn from the 
period which saw the most flarf activity, during the year 2012. This approach necessitated 
by design a reliance on personal contacts drawn from the author’s network of activist 
acquaintances, as well as some observation of public posts made by other users unknown 
to the author. The relatively small scope of the study reflects the transient and contingent 
nature of these kinds of online user practices, existing within and frequently in response to 
the changing and contested regulatory contexts of the platforms and services themselves. 
The precise number of users involved in the practice is incredibly difficult to determine, 
given the nature of the Facebook platform and the fairly organic manner in which the 
practice grew from a larger community context. It is safe to say, however, that the practice 
was not widespread, and was very much a product of a particular online community at a 
certain time and place.
Despite the limited extent of its application, Facebook flarf remains important for 
our understanding of the development of these sites and the cultures that emerge 
alongside them, as users test the extent of their personal agency and their ability to ‘take 
responsibility’ for the problem of hate speech online. The examples included in this paper 
were chosen for their ability to demonstrate the key features of Facebook flarfing, from a 
very limited set of materials collected at the time, or just after, these incidents occurred. 
The ‘real time’ nature of much of the Facebook platform and the algorithmic selection of 
material it chooses to present in the news feed make the discovery and documentation of 
examples that illuminate these practices particularly difficult. All examples are drawn from 
what were at the time of writing publicly visible ‘posts’ and ‘pages’ on Facebook. 
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Responses to Internet Hate
When examining how the issue of harmful speech online has been addressed, an obvious 
division appears, based quite clearly on the differing historical and political traditions of 
the United States and Europe. The former’s history and culture of resolutely defending 
free speech under the protections of the first amendment causes some friction with the 
latter’s greater comfort with state-based intervention in the prohibition of hate speech. 
This comfort can be largely attributed to Europe’s recent history and experiences with 
hate speech in the lead-up to the Second World War. It reflects an awareness of its 
role in enabling the demonisation of minority groups, ranging from Jews and Roma to 
homosexuals and the disabled, acts that prefaced the Holocaust. 
Awareness of the unique problems presented by internet hate speech dates back at least 
to the early BBS (Bulletin Board System) era. Chip Berlet (2000) has described the early 
history of US based hate sites and the range of responses, from individual hackers to US 
Government efforts and the work of prominent civil liberties groups who have extended 
their concern for freedom of speech protections in the public sphere to also encompass 
speech on the internet. Expanding on this history, Frydman and Rorive (2002) have 
examined the involvement of “intermediaries” such as ISPs in preventing or removing hate 
speech online. While acknowledging that European legal frameworks are likely to give 
‘public authorities and human rights activists… better tools to limit the influence of racist, 
Nazis, anti-Semitic and other kind of hate speeches on the Internet,’ they caution that it 
could be a “slippery slope” to new regimes of censorship (Frydman and Rorive, 2002: 55). 
Intermediaries also include websites and web services like Facebook and Twitter, and I 
return to discuss these sites and their typical reluctance to intervene in a moment. 
The concern that too much state intervention in these services may be a “slippery slope” 
to regimes of censorship appears most strongly and is repeatedly emphasised in American 
scholarship on the issue, such as Barnett’s (2007) Untangling the Web of Hate, which 
examines the US Constitution’s first amendment protections as they apply to hate speech 
online. Through a content analysis of the material hosted on hate sites such as Ku Klux 
Klan and Neo-Nazi websites, Barnett applies the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudential tests 
of what constitutes unprotected speech according to the first amendment and finds that 
the vast majority of material hosted on these US based hate sites would be considered 
protected expressions. Similarly, Foxman and Wolf ’s (2013) Viral Hate, produced with the 
support of the Anti-Defamation League (a political lobby group founded primarily to counter 
anti-Semitism), articulates this distinctly American position on hate speech with greater 
nuance than some first amendment advocates who are reluctant to view any restrictions 
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on speech as acceptable. In Foxman and Wolf ’s (2013: 60) view, hate speech ‘laws are the 
least effective way to deal with the problem.’ Instead, they argue:
… the best antidote to hate speech is counter speech – exposing hate speech 
for its deceitful and false content, setting the record straight, and promoting 
the values of respect and diversity. (Foxman and Wolf, 2013: 129)
Though a noble goal, it is clearly unable to account for the unequal burden that it places 
upon individuals most harmed by hate speech. Women and minorities are, in effect, caught 
between a lack of state regulatory intervention in online hate speech, and the reticence 
of internet services such as Facebook and Twitter which, as Gillespie (2010: 12) remarks, 
deploy the rhetoric of the platform in order to position themselves as a simple ‘facilitator 
that does not pick favourites.’ Gillespie (2010: 11) unpacks this opting-out of intervention, 
explaining that:
… in the effort to limit their liability not only from…legal charges [arising from 
users infringing copyright] but also more broadly the cultural charges of being 
puerile, frivolous, debased, etc., intermediaries like YouTube need to position 
themselves as just hosting – empowering all by choosing none.
The implication of this state of affairs is that those harassed are now left to address and 
take responsibility for the conditions of their own harassment via ‘counter speech’ – if we 
take Foxman and Wolf (2013) at their word. Challenging their fairly simplistic conception 
of efficacious ‘counter speech’ is a body of work from feminists and other theorists 
who criticise the conception of the neutral liberal state and the ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
assumptions upon which these types of claim rest. 
Representative of the more European perspective, Abigail Levin (2010: 1) argues that the 
idea that the state should remain a neutral facilitator of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ which 
assumes hate speech is defeated by truthful, efficacious counter speech (Foxman and Wolf, 
2013) is incompatible with another commitment of the liberal state – that of the equality of 
citizens, which is often sacrificed in service of non-intervention in the expression of ideas. 
Most crucially for its theoretical legitimacy, Levin (2010) argues the hands-off neutral state 
does not lead naturally to better (or more truthful) ideas winning out via competitive market 
forces, since among other reasons:
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… our systemically racist, sexist, and homophobic society has had the effect 
that certain dominant racist, sexist, and homophobic views have become so 
deeply held as not to be amenable to rational discussion, with the effect that 
minorities’ and women’s voices are not heard fairly in the marketplace. (Levin, 
2010: 1)
This sentiment echoes a body of literature pointing towards the amount of work required 
to produce free markets themselves, for instance Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation 
(2001 [1944]) and Nikolas Rose’ Powers of Freedom (2004 [1999]: 65), along with a host 
of others who have criticised the ‘neutral marketplace of ideas’ on a variety of grounds 
(see: Brazeal, 2011; Goldman and Cox, 1996; Sparrow and Goodin, 2001). Levin’s (2010: 4) 
conclusion, drawn with regard to the current skewed marketplace, is that ‘the state as a 
neutral facilitator of private ideas is untenable and must be dropped’ and an interventionist 
liberal state conceptualised. Such ideas apply just as much to social media sites’ 
reluctance to intervene in their users’ generation of content. 
Addressing concerns that immediately follow any proposed greater state interventionism 
and the automatic cries of ‘censorship’ that ensue when the prospect of state intervention 
into speech and truth claims are raised, both Judith Butler (1994) and Frederick Schauer 
(1994) have offered important critiques of uncritical understandings of censorship as simply 
‘preference frustration’ without consideration of the impact of state power and discourses 
on the formation of these preferences themselves. In other words, the neutral marketplace 
of ideas is not, and cannot ever be, perfectly and entirely neutral.
Banks (2010: 234) construes enforcement as the main difficulty for contemporary European 
and other nations’ interventionist approaches to hate speech:
[The] rise in hate speech online is compounded by difficulties in policing such 
activities which sees the Internet remain largely unregulated. Criminal justice 
agencies are unlikely to proactively dedicate time and money to investigate 
offences that are not a significant public priority. Consequently, the police will 
rarely respond to online hate speech unless a specific crime is reported.
This reluctance to intervene is repeatedly encountered when individuals seek intervention 
by state authorities such as US police departments. For example, in early 2014 a 
high-profile piece discussing online hate speech by journalist Amanda Hess (2014) detailed 
her own experiences with online threats to her person, the mental and emotional cost of 
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the permissiveness of online hate speech directed at women in the United States, and 
US law enforcement’s prohibitive jurisdictional limitations and frequent reluctance to 
investigate the majority of these incidents. This seemed to set the pattern for the year, 
as in October of 2014, feminist media critic Anita Sarkeesian made headlines when Utah 
State University received a highly credible and detailed anonymous threat to carry out a 
mass shooting if Sarkeesian refused to cancel a speaking event (Wingfield, 2014). Because 
of Utah’s concealed carry law, the police in that state would not (or could not) prevent 
attendees from carrying weapons into the meeting, and the event was subsequently 
cancelled. Examples like these underscore the difficulties facing effective state regulation, 
given the practical reality that authorities in various nations (none less than the United 
States, where many internet sites and social networking sites are based) cannot be relied 
upon to do the work of policing and preventing hate speech, particularly online. 
Given the issues state authorities and legislators face, one might be tempted to hope that 
internet intermediaries such as social networking sites might take the initiative to combat 
the issue of online hate speech themselves. However, barring one significant victory which 
I discuss later in this paper, many sites (Facebook included) have been reluctant to take 
a more proactive role in preventing or responding to hate speech on their services. The 
reasoning for this is partly due to a lack of legislative compulsion – as we have already 
seen, the United States is reluctant to legislate against hate speech – and partly because 
sites like Facebook must negotiate the competing interests of users, advertisers, and 
government legislatures (Gillespie, 2010: 7). In order for these sites to function, and remain 
profitable, they:
… must present themselves strategically to each of these audiences, carve out 
a role and a set of expectations that is acceptable to each and also serves 
their own financial interests, while resolving or at least eliding the contradic-
tions between them. (Gillespie, 2010: 7)
While Banks (2010: 234) rightly believes that ‘a broad coalition of government, business 
and citizenry is likely to be most effective in reducing the harm caused by hate speech’ 
this ideal scenario does not seem likely at present. It may be unjust to expect individual 
users (particularly those most harmed by hate speech) to take responsibility for online hate 
speech, but from a practical perspective Banks argues there is still a role to be played by 
users of social media sites. He concludes that:
… individual responses to online hate may only have a limited impact on ac-
cess to online material, but the degree of responsibility of individual users can 
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both promote a culture of intolerance towards online hate and contribute to 
efforts to ‘reclaim’ the web. (Banks, 2010: 238)
While Banks’ argument is persuasive, besides ‘alerting relevant authorities to incidents 
of cyberhate which may warrant law enforcement intervention’ (Banks, 2010: 238), he 
mostly leaves unelaborated what precisely is entailed by his call for individual users to 
take a degree of responsibility for online culture in spaces like Facebook and Twitter. 
Furthermore, his claims to the minimal effectiveness of these individual responses may 
remain unconvincing for those who hold to US approaches that eschew state regulation in 
favour of individual counter speech. 
In light of this context, I now turn to the creative activist practice of Facebook flarf as 
a method of challenging individual incidents of hate speech on the site. I interpret this 
practice as users taking a degree of responsibility for online hate speech and attempting 
to do something about it. This case study demonstrates the utility (and limits) of these 
individual responses, and perhaps more crucially, shows one way in which users at a 
particular moment attempted to ‘reclaim the web,’ negotiating and acting within the 
regulatory regime that Facebook presented in 2012 when the practice was most active. I 
argue that Facebook flarf belongs to an emerging trend of discursive activist strategy that 
takes an agonistic approach to online discursive norms, repurposing some of the tools 
and tactics more traditionally associated with online trolling, but which are more simply 
reflective of current internet culture, described as a culture of ubiquitous memes (Phillips, 
2013; Leaver, 2013).
What is Facebook flarf?
Facebook flarfing consists of tagging Facebook pages and apps in text fields such as 
status updates and comment threads, building up strings of phrases into an often-absurd 
or ironic comment, message or poem. Introduced by the site sometime in late 2009, a 
tag is made by typing the ‘@’ symbol followed by one or more characters, resulting in the 
appearance of a drop down text box with options reflecting choices suggested by the 
tagging algorithm, chosen from the pool of total Facebook pages. Selecting one of these 
options inserts the name of the page or app into the text field which then appears in blue 
as a hyperlink, visually distinguishing the tag (or ‘flarf ’) from ‘ordinary’ text comments which 
appear in black. Tags may be anything from a single letter or word up to whole sentences 
or even paragraphs of text, and this otherwise innocuous technical feature, most commonly 
used for tagging individual users, briefly blossomed into a rich, if relatively niche, variety of 
poetic and activist practices. 
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The exhausting breadth of pages that one can tag in order to flarf transforms it into a 
creative, playful practice of digging through the extensive source material, filled with 
cultural detritus, typos, and memes that make up the site. The distinctive content of this 
giant archive of text is primarily Facebook page titles, populated by the hundreds of 
millions of Facebook users over the many years the site has existed, giving Facebook 
flarf much of its distinctive character. As a result, flarf poems and comments take on a 
characteristically ‘Facebook’ feel, involving cultural tropes the site has facilitated, such as 
briefly popular meme pages that conform to certain repeated tropes or structures – for 
example, the myriad ‘The awkward moment when…’ pages, a meme that was quite popular 
on the site around 2011. 
In attempting to describe the effect and aesthetic of Facebook flarf, Caleb Hildebrand 
(2012) suggested that it repurposes the objects of preference (pages that people have 
‘liked’) to subversive ends, and that it ‘asks naïve users of [Facebook] to consider the ways 
in which their sincerely expressed sentiments may be twisted and blasphemed.’ Earnest 
expressions of ‘likes’ and interests, captured in the form of Facebook pages, become 
hijacked by playfully irreverent flarfers and the noise of these nonsense tags – by standing 
out in their distinct, hyperlink-blue text – adds to an aesthetic of confusion or disarray 
that is often in stark contrast to the otherwise clean corporate experience of Facebook. 
This effect can also be viewed as a process of ‘personalisation’, or user-customisation of 
the Facebook environment – an attempt to ‘take control’ or have some say in the tone 
or feel of an online space. In the next section I return to this theme in order to connect 
this impulse with a sense of taking responsibility for online spaces and the cultures that 
emerge within them.
Facebook flarf has roots in an earlier poetic form based around tailoring Google searches 
to achieve exquisitely bizarre results. The poet Gary Sullivan, who was involved with 
these early efforts (emerging as early as 2001), has described the practice as emerging in 
response to the sombre, patriotic mood that descended upon the US post–9/11 (Sullivan, 
2009). Calling it an early symptom of the ironic phase of US culture, early examples of 
poetic flarf were often filled with ethnic and racial slurs, using repeated Google searches 
with obscure and unrelated strings of words (e.g. “peace” + “kittens” or “pizza” + “kitty”) 
as a way of finding offensive, horrible or absurdist text to share amongst a community 
of internet-savvy poets (Sullivan, 2009). In his history of the practice, he gives a three-
pronged definition of flarf as a particular noisy/messy/irreverent aesthetic (similar to the 
aesthetic described above), as a verb (as in bringing out something innately ‘flarfy’ about a 
text) and, importantly, as a community practice (Sullivan, 2009).
Facebook flarf is often performed as part of a small group or community, such as the Alt.
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Lit community, which was responsible for adapting the practice to Facebook. A diffuse and 
difficult to define online social movement centred around self-publishing, Alt.Lit writers 
and poets like Steve Roggenbuck played a large role in popularising the use of Facebook 
flarf (Roggenbuck, 2011a; Roggenbuck, 2011b). Hildebrand (2012) presents screen captures 
of Roggenbuck interacting with his fans and fellow community members, as they take 
turns posting short absurdist messages in combinations of flarf tags riffing off of each 
other’s postings. Taking the lead in a post, Rogenbuck’s comment “Hashtag Whale Sex” 
(formed by tagging Facebook pages ‘hashtag’ as well as ‘whale’ and ‘sex’) elicits response 
like “Hashtag Whale Hunger Games” (a combination of tags for ‘hashtag’ ‘whale’ and 
‘hunger games’), as well as “Hashtag Haveing Fun” [sic] (pages ‘hashtag’ and ‘haveing 
fun’ [sic]). Flarf seemed in many early instances to beget flarf from others in a contagious 
and spontaneous elicitation of group activity, with flarf threads often degenerating into 
absurdity while facilitating mutual engagement with community members.
Figure 1
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As is clearly on display in Figure 1, left on a publicly shared photo posted to Roggenbuck’s 
Facebook wall in mid 2012, much of the flarf is absurdist, vaguely sexual or confrontational, 
echoing earlier pre-Facebook found-text flarf. Many references in the thread to ‘yolo’ (You 
Only Live Once, an acronym peaking in popularity and cultural awareness at the time) give 
the flarf a distinctly pop culture and timely feel. While the pages tagged (“What you lookin’ 
at? You all a bunch of fuckin’ assholes.”) might be read as antagonistic or confrontational if 
expressed outside this context, being on a prominent figure’s Facebook wall contributes to 
this being more of a playful public performance than a provocative activity. 
The practice gels with what Whitney Phillips has observed as the changing relationship 
between trolling as a practice and the cultural signifiers such as memes (which are often 
used in flarf posts) that would once have identified these activities more clearly as ‘trolling.’ 
Phillips (2013) notes that, ‘what used to provide unequivocal proof that trolling was afoot 
no longer (necessarily) denotes anything, other than a basic familiarity with memes.’ 
Likewise, when evaluating a public Facebook page organised to protest the Australian 
broadcast coverage of the 2012 Olympic games which also frequently deployed memes 
and tropes associated with trolling and troll culture, Tama Leaver (2013: 226) has noted that 
‘the iconography of trolling, if not the wholesale practice itself, has entered mainstream 
culture, moving away from the subcultural fringes.’ In flarf postings on Facebook we often 
find something perhaps even more reflexive: a subculture (Alt.Lit poets) repurposing 
the ubiquity of memes and redeploying its artifacts (Facebook pages) for an altogether 
different subcultural practice.
Facebook flarf in general and distinctly activist deployments of flarf in particular, seemed to 
peak in 2012, and instances of the practice have become fewer and farther between. There 
was a particularly noticeable decline in its use for activist ends around the same time, 
possibly attributable to both technical changes to the Facebook platform (consideration of 
which are beyond the scope of this article), and more importantly to changes in Facebook’s 
regulatory environment, particularly around enforcement of its hate speech policies, which 
I turn to in the final discussion. But for a while Facebook flarf seemed on the verge of 
becoming a more widely known and accepted practice with potential to alter the content 
and tone of online discussions in the circles of those who deployed it. In the next section 
I describe some of these more active and confrontational uses of flarf, within the limited 
scope for individual agency allowed within Facebook’s regulatory context.
The Utility of Facebook Flarf
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On the 18th of January 2013 Melbourne based Facebook user Kristina Arnott left a public 
comment on the wall of McDonald’s Australia’s public Facebook page. Her complaint refers 
to a McDonald’s advertisement that was screening on free to air television at the time, and 
it quickly attracted likes and comments from other Facebook users:
Is it really necessary to include stupid young men beeping at a woman in your 
advertising? And that woman smiling shyly as if she is flattered and even en-
joys such interactions? I don’t know a single woman who likes being beeped 
at or yelled at or leered at from cars, in fact most of my female friends find it 
annoying or even enough to make them feel a little uncomfortable in certain 
circumstances. Do you really need to encourage such behaviour by further 
normalising it and making it seem like a positive experience for all involved?? 
(Arnott, 2013)
The post, which was publicly visible and thus able to appear in the newsfeeds of those 
whose friends liked or commented on the post, quickly gained a significant amount of 
‘likes’ and attention. Many however disagreed with Arnott’s assessment, and dismissed her 
concerns, with one (male) commenter telling her to ‘settle down’ and another (also male) 
telling her to ‘find something better to complain about.’ The thread was quickly derailed 
from initial discussions of the advertisement by commenters, who made sexist jokes and 
steered the discussion into irrelevant territory. It initially received only a small amount of 
engagement from individuals attempting to argue against or reason with these detractors.
Several acquaintances of mine noticed the thread and began intervening, first with earnest 
comments and attempts to engage argumentatively, with what Foxman and Wolf (2013: 
129) would call ‘counter speech’ that revealed ‘its deceitful and false content.’ When it 
quickly became clear no good-faith discussion was to be had with these detractors, my 
acquaintances began posting noisy, agonistic and nonsense flarf. I joined in myself and, 
along with a small group of acquaintances, began leaving flarf comments which referenced 
or played with the original nature of the complaint, such as ‘I Wish I Were Diving In a hotted 
up stolen taxi Beepin at random pedestrians & waving just to mess with their heads Hard 
Cunts’ [sic]. Other comments included very simple or short non-sequiturs, such as ‘börp’ 
[sic] and longer phrases made out of several stitched together page names like:
I was only 19 when i stopped talking to you, i found out how depressing u 
made my life “Sandwich Jokes!!! DeR DaH Im FuCKInG sTuPiD lAla”” it is so 
hard being so fucking funny all the time NOT [sic]
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Even with a small number of commenters, it was possible to partially drown out the 
offensive jokes and comments under a tide of blue-text nonsense, which often played 
with or obliquely commented on the sexist comments that were being left. The inclusion 
of a reference to “Sandwich Jokes!!!” was clearly referring to a comment left earlier in the 
thread expressing the classic sexist trope ‘make me a sandwich,’ which the flarf here was 
criticising and calling out for not being funny. From a practical perspective, the flood of flarf 
comments was making the derogatory comments harder to see, both visually (due to the 
blue text ‘noise’ that stood out and surrounded them) and statistically (with more nonsense 
comments quickly being left than harmful ones). A feature of Facebook comment threads 
is that once a thread reaches a certain number of comments earlier ones become hidden 
and a user needs to select “view previous comments” in order to expand the thread and 
see comments left earlier. This leads to a dynamic in which it becomes something of a 
contest over who can have the last word, with newcomers to the thread less likely to see 
the offensive comments, having to scroll back up to see them. As trifling an achievement 
as this may seem, moving comments further up a thread chronologically by adding to the 
end of a thread is precisely the kind of limited strategy afforded to individuals in their 
responses to hate speech on Facebook. For one, it does nothing to prevent new instances 
of hate speech from being posted, merely hiding older ones. It also doesn’t take flarf in 
particular to do this kind of flooding of threads, however the nature of flarf as somewhat 
viral, often eliciting further flarf responses from others, does contribute to its efficacy in this 
respect. Flarf also provides users with a pattern or template to employ when they wish to 
flood or drown out hate speech in threads like this, perhaps performing a similar function 
to the ‘SAGE’ feature of the 4chan imageboard – when a user wishes to avoid ‘bumping’ a 
thread on 4chan, either to express disagreement or dislike, and avoiding drawing further 
attention to the thread, users can place ‘SAGE’ in the ‘options’ field and the post will not be 
bumped to the top of the imageboard in question upon posting. 
These socio-technical practices carry real weight, often acting as ‘boundary-policing social 
practice’ (Manivannan, 2013) and can be considered a somewhat more efficacious aspect 
of Facebook flarf than simply the practical aspect of flooding deleterious comments to 
make them harder to notice. Furthermore, I would position the kind of action undertaken by 
these flarf commenters as what Frances Shaw (2012: 42) calls ‘discursive activism’, which 
she defines as:
… speech or texts that seek to challenge opposing discourses by exposing 
power relations within these discourses, denaturalizing what appears natural 
(Fine, 1992: 221) and demonstrating the flawed assumptions and situatedness 
of mainstream social discourse.
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The way flarf performs this challenging of norms is twofold: firstly by demonstrating both 
competence or mastery of the Facebook platform itself and secondly by being a form 
of meta-textual play that can be read as a form of personalisation and imposition of a 
‘flarfy’ tone, style or aesthetic upon an online space. I would argue that flarf is similar to 
the creative use of emoticons and other typographical elements unique to digital textual 
communication, a phenomenon Brenda Danet (2001) has called ‘Cyberplay.’ These kinds 
of personalisations demonstrate a high level of experience with navigating the social 
and technical spaces of Facebook – flarf-tagging being a relatively rarefied practice. 
Significantly for this argument, Kelly, et al. (2008: 2381) agree with this interpretation, 
having found that, in certain online discussion situations, greater employment of these 
kinds of textual ‘personalisations’ (such as emoticons, abbreviations like ‘lol,’ and to 
which I would suggest we could add flarf ) often result in the users employing them being 
perceived as more experienced, or more intelligent than users who do not personalise 
their text.
Engaging in flarf is also implicitly a form of meta-textual discussion, drawing attention to 
the medium of communication itself. Facebook flarf performs a reflexivity that makes it 
very difficult to forget one is speaking or writing on Facebook whenever it appears. This 
is both because of the contrasting blue hyperlink text colour that makes it stand out from 
‘ordinary’ text, and because it frequently, often as much by design as by incidence, makes 
reference to or invokes the cultural tropes of Facebook itself. Engaging in flarf can send 
a meta-textual message to those leaving hate speech comments to remind them that they 
are on the shared-public space of Facebook, and without having to say as much, that 
the flarfist(s) are actively refusing or resisting entering into ‘good faith’ discussion with 
this material, thereby relegating it to ‘beneath discussion.’ Metaphorically, this could be 
compared to a situation where, in a face-to-face conversation, one or more individuals turn 
away from or present their backs to a person in order to communicate social displeasure 
or a wish to exclude someone. In the thread on the McDonald’s Facebook wall, some good 
faith discussion with the dissenting parties who rejected Arnott’s argument was attempted, 
but was quickly redirected into flarf-based mockery when this good faith dialogue was 
not reciprocated. Not much else can be done when those espousing hate speech cannot 
even be engaged with sincerely. Foxman and Wolf ’s (2013) claims about the efficacy of 
counter speech seem to miss their mark when facing such recalcitrance as regularly occurs 
in online spaces, a fact no doubt encouraging users who wish to take responsibility for 
harmful speech online to explore alternative methods of engagement, like flarf.
A similar dynamic of refusal-to-engage occurred on a thread on the Facebook page for 
fictional character and “lambassador” Sam Kekovich, created for a series of advertisements 
promoting lamb eating on Australia Day. One exchange in this thread consisted of subtly 
poking-fun at the reactionary nature of some of the sites fans and their use of the phrase 
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“un-Australian” – a dogwhistle term with often racist connotations. Most of the preceding 
comments were subtle criticisms of the page made by playing at ignorance, however once 
other sincere commenters were drawn to engage with them, flarf made an appearance, 
communicating something beyond just the content of the flarf, and again indicating some 
kind of social displeasure or opprobrium via meta-textual play. At one point in the thread, a 
fellow user (unknown to me) directed a comment at my acquaintance, to which he replied 
with a pithy plain-text ‘let me help clear it up a little for you’ followed only by a single, 
lengthy flarf tag constructed out of one extraordinarily-long page title:
i dont like drama , childish people . uma hella cool person till uu disrespect me 
. i hate shit talkers . if uu referrin tah me in a status go on ahead n tag me in 
it…if uu got balls enuff . i dont care about much anymore thats just how thee 
cookie crum [sic] (Midworth, 2012)
The posting was ambiguous about the extent of its seriousness, repurposing a typo-strewn 
cultural artifact of the Facebook platform, and yet the sense of displeasure was clear. This 
social aloofness and unwillingness to engage ‘normally’ or sincerely with hate speakers 
signalled by flarf also works to send an implicit message to many other potential or actual 
sincere commenters, who may well share the same concerns about the potentially racist 
nature of the discussion or the Facebook page itself, and the same objections to the 
hate speech. The message it sends to these potential allies is do not waste your time, 
and particularly do not bother engaging (or at least, do not bother engaging in good 
faith since it will only cost you time, energy or emotional resources). This can be doubly 
important given the ambiguous context in which much internet discussion in the quasi-
public space of Facebook now occurs. As previously mentioned, the classic ‘tells’ of 
trolling no longer denote anything more than what Phillips (2013) describes as ‘a basic 
familiarity with memes’ leaving earnest individuals keen to challenge, address or in some 
way take responsibility for online cultures of hate, without any clear indication of what is 
worth spending their time or energy engaging with. When it is used in this way, Facebook 
flarf can communicate to other earnest and well-meaning critics of hate speech that there 
are people who are willing to ‘play’ with these hate speakers (sincere or otherwise), and 
to ‘outdo’ potential trolls. Flarf displays a willingness to take on, and even enjoy playing 
with commenters on these objectionable pages, so those for whom this is an emotionally 
charged issue (as much hate speech is for its intended recipients) do not have to. In this 
way it offered, for the period that it was most active, a way for some users of the site to 
take charge and take responsibility for the online spaces they inhabited, in much the way 
Banks (2010) calls for. 
A significant limitation on flarf ’s practical efficacy, then, is that it largely relies upon 
fibreculturejournal.org       FCJ-170        63 
Benjamin Abraham
individual actions – to achieve much of the effects mentioned above (particularly the 
practical hiding of hate speech behind a flood of blue text) it requires a relatively sizeable 
and active community relative to the offending hate speakers. Those wishing to be 
effective with flarf and make a significant contribution to online culture on Facebook 
must be willing and able to respond to hate speech in a timely manner, since much of the 
impetus behind this goal is preventing the offending hate speech from being seen. All of 
flarf ’s positive effects – from the drowning out of hate speech, to expressing opprobrium 
towards it, as well as contributing to online norms – are significantly diminished when 
deployed by only one or a small number of individuals. In other words, on the “neutral” 
Facebook platform which the service provides, Facebook flarf still commonly relies 
for success on strength in numbers and the organisation of communities, which I only 
observed happening in an ad hoc and small-scale way in the community of users deploying 
it. 
In the McDonald’s thread, the ‘drowning out’ function was limited in that it was only 
effective for the period flarfers were active and available (and invested enough in the 
thread) to keep commenting, which petered out as the discussion went on into the late 
evening and people drifted off to bed or other activities. Furthermore, a significant amount 
of the initial flarf that was left was later deleted over the next hours or days, presumably 
by Facebook itself, likely in response to other users ‘flagging’ the comments as spam 
(perhaps done by commenters expressing the sexist speech themselves). The flarf itself 
may have fallen foul of Facebook’s community standards, the most likely culprit being 
Facebook’s community standards regarding ‘phishing and spam,’ yet the description 
of what counts as such only currently refers to unsolicited commercial contact. It is 
conceivable, however unlikely, that the comments that went missing were removed by the 
operators of the McDonald’s Facebook page itself, however there was no other indication 
that the thread was ever observed or moderated by the page owners who, much like 
Facebook themselves, would probably prefer to avoid liability or responsibility for what 
is said on their page. If it was the administrators of the McDonald’s Australia Facebook 
page, they deemed it fair to leave some flarf but not others (including some flarf containing 
profanities), and as far as it was possible to tell they also removed none of the sexist 
comments. An alternative explanation altogether is that some flarf posts tripped automated 
spam detection and prevention algorithms, which possibly automatically flagged them for 
review by Facebook’s moderation staff, explaining their later disappearance. 
This is yet another example of the regulatory environment that Facebook presents to 
users, one that is often opaque and that needs to be constantly negotiated by users 
wishing to explore what freedom and constraints they face when attempting to take 
responsibility for online culture and challenge hate speech on Facebook. In the following 
section I turn to discuss in more detail this regulatory environment and some attempts that 
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have been successful at pressuring Facebook into changing it. This informs both how we 
view Facebook flarf ’s history and potential, and why it may have emerged when it did. It 
also illuminates details of the broader landscape facing users and groups invested in the 
elimination of the worst aspects of hate speech online.
Facebook’s Regulatory Environment 
and its Relationship to Individual Action
Facebook flarf can be interpreted, at least partially, as a response to Facebook’s historically 
lacklustre and inconsistent policing of its aforementioned community standards – a set 
of regulations with greater room for interpretation (even misinterpretation) and more 
lackadaisical enforcement than the stricter (and often legally binding) terms of service. As 
of late 2014, Facebook’s own community standards:
… [do] not permit hate speech, but distinguishes between serious and humor-
ous speech. While we encourage you to challenge ideas, institutions, events, 
and practices, we do not permit individuals or groups to attack others based 
on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability or medical condition. (Facebook Inc., 2014)
As mentioned earlier in Frydman and Rorive’s (2002) discussion of intermediaries, 
Facebook does not take an active role policing the content of expressions uttered on its 
platform, as it is not legally required to. This is because Facebook is (presumably, thought 
this has likely not been tested in court) protected by the same safe harbour provisions 
applicable to internet service providers and internet hosts (of which Facebook would 
be considered to be one example). To a degree this is explained by Gillespie’s (2010) 
argument about the rhetoric of the ‘platform’ and the way the phrase allows sites like 
Facebook to downplay their own liabilities and responsibilities for everything from the 
illegal to the simply sordid material that circulates through the service. Gillespie (2010: 12) 
reminds us that ‘platform’:
… is a valuable and persuasive token in legal environments, positing their 
service in a familiar metaphoric framework – merely the neutral provision of 
content, a vehicle for art rather than its producer or patron – where liability 
should fall to the users themselves.
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Instead of an active policing of the material that passes through its servers, and because of 
this cultural-discursive positioning as a neutral facilitator of content, Facebook can take a 
reactive approach to policing content on its platform. It relies on user-generated reports via 
the flagging of particular content, such as comments, statuses and pages. This introduces 
a certain permissive dynamic to the social regulation of hate speech on the site, a kind of 
‘quasi-privacy’ that lets users in their own semi-private spaces get away with transgressions 
that might receive social or legal sanction if they did not avoid the notice of other users. 
One consequence of the reactive approach to regulation of hate speech on Facebook is it 
becomes possible and even likely that concerned users fail to notify Facebook of instances 
of hate speech in time to prevent its intended recipients seeing it. Indeed, the burden of 
‘reporting’ instances of hate speech to some extent presumes that recipients will see it (and 
then report it). In my conversations with some of the flarf activists I observed on Facebook it 
is clear that many users do not even bother to report hate speech to begin with, particularly 
given that until recently Facebook’s implementation of its community standards policy 
was notably unpredictable and highly permissive when faced with the issue of public hate 
speech online. 
One needs only to recall the numerous hate speech promoting pages that existed on the 
site with the tag ‘controversial humour’ to note this lax enforcement at work. For instance, 
the Facebook page ‘Aboriginal memes,’ which garnered a great deal of public attention 
in August of 2012 in the Australian media, following a series of grassroots campaigns 
organised to put pressure on Facebook to close down the page – including two separate 
online petitions that attracted several thousand signatures (Oboler, 2012: 10). The page 
itself, which posted image macros (photos with captions) that played upon some of the 
worst racial stereotypes of indigenous Australians was reported by many Facebook users, 
with the Australian Online Hate Prevention Institute documenting in their 2012 report on the 
page their own attempts to have the page removed. Facebook subsequently declined to 
deactivate the page, merely prepending the warning phrase “[controversial humour]” to the 
page’s name, a practice that it employed across the site with numerous “controversial” sites 
that promoted and propagated hate speech against various groups. The Australian based 
Online Hate Prevention Institute’s report described the decision as ‘creating an attitude 
where people feel racism is acceptable.’ (Oboler, 2012: 56) The report’s author takes a 
markedly different approach to the ‘neutral platform’ discourse, noting that ‘Facebook is not 
a neutral player, but is actively promoting this shift based on their “Facebook Principles.”’ 
(Oboler, 2012: 56) This is a sentiment clearly at odds with the site’s positioning of itself, 
as having little or no responsibility for the content on it. The Australian Human Rights 
Commissioner met several times with the company about the site, and it was further referred 
to the Australian Communications and Media Authority. (Oboler, 2012: 10, 58) The Aboriginal 
Memes page was eventually taken down, but only after the threat of state intervention and 
regulation became apparent.
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In response to this and the many other instances of lax and uneven enforcement of 
Facebook’s own community standards, in May of 2013 a coalition of groups, led by the 
‘Women, Action and the Media’ activist group, the Everyday Sexism project, and more 
than 100 affiliated women’s and activist groups, petitioned Facebook ‘to take concrete, 
effective action to end gender-based hate speech on its site.’ (Women, Action and the 
Media, 2013) Their actions were in response particularly to a long string of incidences and 
the widespread perception that Facebook did not treat hate speech directed at women as 
seriously as other forms of hate speech, for instance, anti-Semitism and racism. Journalist 
Dara Kerr (2013), reporting on the action, highlights the extremity of some of the content 
that would often be reviewed and, without the looming threat of state intervention or 
regulation, would not removed from Facebook instead receiving the “controversial humour” 
tag, despite being in clear breach of the site’s standards. Kerr (2013) notes that:
… several Facebook pages have popped up that encourage or make a joke of 
violence against women, pages like Fly Kicking Sluts in the Uterus, Violently 
Raping Your Friend Just for Laughs, and Raping your Girlfriend.
The Women, Action and the Media petition which was sent to advertisers to notify them 
that their advertisements were running alongside such objectionable material was a 
modest success, with the coalition of groups managing to raise awareness of Facebook’s 
permissive acceptance of hate speech directed at women with both the public and, 
perhaps just as importantly, with several major advertisers on the site (Kerr, 2013). 
Facebook’s response to the petition, and the growing pressure it faced to address the 
issue, came in the form of a statement from Marne Levine (2013), VP of global public policy 
at the site. Crucially she acknowledges Facebook’s failures in enforcement, specifically –
In recent days, it has become clear that our systems to identify and remove 
hate speech have failed to work as effectively as we would like, particularly 
around issues of gender-based hate. In some cases, content is not being re-
moved as quickly as we want. In other cases, content that should be removed 
has not been or has been evaluated using outdated criteria. 
As a result, many fewer pages on Facebook exist with the ‘controversial humour’ tag and 
the result has been fewer visible instances of public hate speech on the platform since. 
However this is only true for pages and groups, the more public and visible spaces of the 
site, and the same cannot be said for individual comments expressing hate speech, the 
reporting processes for which remain largely confined to hiding the content from the sight 
of those objecting to it. An important notice at the very bottom of Facebook’s community 
standards page reminds users that:
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… it’s possible that something could be disagreeable or disturbing to you with-
out meeting the criteria for being removed or blocked. For this reason, we also 
offer personal controls over what you see, such as the ability to hide or quietly 
cut ties with people, Pages, or applications that offend you.
Facebook’s regulatory environment, then, still has significant gaps and weaknesses 
in its approach to preventing and addressing hate speech, continuing in places to 
defer responsibility for hate speech to individual users via ‘personal controls.’ Despite 
the success in ensuring Facebook more actively addresses some of the more public 
components of the site like the offensive pages, the fundamental structure remains one 
of non-intervention by the site at the level of individual user speech, and the deferment 
of responsibility to individuals “offended” by hate speech remains in place. User driven 
practices like Facebook flarf may contribute to addressing the remaining gaps that allow 
for hate speech in these other areas of the site that are less able to attract the kind 
of mainstream attention required to instigate significant structural change. Users can 
contribute, as we saw earlier, in practical ways, such as by drowning out and making hate 
speech less visible, and by saving the emotional energy of those who would engage 
in counter speech. They can also contribute in more discursive or normative ways, 
contributing to ‘taking back the web’ as Banks (2010) suggests, through personalisation 
and discursive activism. Facebook flarf outlines the sense in which a space exists between 
the competing regulatory regimes of Facebook and state based legislation, a space 
that leaves significant room for user-led creative responses to online problems like hate 
speech. 
Since its peak in or around late 2012 and early 2013, the amount of flarf has, anecdotally, 
reduced in the circles where I observed that it was once fairly common. This may be partly 
attributable to the wearing off of the novelty of the activity, as much as to other changes 
in Facebook’s enforcement of its community standards, following the WAM! Coalition and 
others’ efforts to confront Facebook and force it to take greater responsibility for the public 
hate speech promulgated on its platform. The WAM! Coalition group’s success in attaining 
Facebook’s redoubled commitment to enforce its own community standards via regulation 
may have also contributed to the reduced need for Facebook flarf, since reporting public 
pages that promote hate speech through Facebook’s reporting tools should (in theory) 
now prove more effective. This is in spite of Facebook’s largely deferential approach to 
individual utterances of hate speech (in comment threads in particular) which it remains 
difficult to flag and report, relying largely on “personal controls” that do little to change 
what is visible to the public. 
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This discussion serves to underscore the negotiated space in which Facebook flarf 
and other individual responses to hate speech exist, and the limited avenues that are 
available to restrict and supress hate speech within the larger regulatory regimes of both 
the platform itself and state based legislations. There are significant costs involved with 
deploying flarf individually and in small communities, in terms of the time and effort it takes 
to supress hate speech, further reinforcing the importance of larger scale interventions, 
public pressure and state level responses, as both Levin (2010) and Banks (2010) have 
argued. 
Conclusion
This paper has aimed to inform our understanding of the problem of hate speech online 
and the unique constraints and opportunities for intervention by individual users on 
Facebook, principally via a small case study of the creative activist practice of Facebook 
flarf. I began by discussing the broad international context that hate speech occurs 
within, highlighting difference between United States and European comfort with the 
regulation of hate speech and questions around state intervention. Just as important as 
these historical and cultural differences, however, are practical issues with online hate 
speech interventions, with governments and state agencies often unwilling or unable to 
regulate online hate speech, and with intermediary web services like social media similarly 
reluctant. Intermediary services like Facebook and Twitter have often sought to position 
themselves as a ‘neutral platform’ the better to avoid liability for the material that passes 
through their services.
Into this context I placed flarf, beginning with a history of the practice in found-text poetry 
and the way in which it came to be reconfigured and repurposed to employ the Facebook 
tagging algorithm. I then elaborated the specific utility I saw in Facebook flarf activism as 
observed during its peak in 2012, arguing that Facebook flarf presents a useful case study 
for theories of regulating and responding to hate speech online. I argued that Facebook 
flarf has some ability to drown out hate speech practically and aesthetically, but perhaps 
more importantly it can serve to communicate social opprobrium and community limits 
on acceptable discourse online. Facebook flarf represents an encouraging attempt by 
users to ‘take responsibility’ for online hate speech and online culture in the spaces they 
frequent, through personalisation and the performance of an expertise within the platforms 
affordances. It also communicates a meta-textual and reflexive awareness of the medium 
of communication itself. I situated the practice of Facebook flarfing for activist ends within 
a contemporary context of ubiquitous memes and the uncertainty around the sincerity of 
online comments and discourse, viewing flarf as an example of discursive activism that 
fibreculturejournal.org       FCJ-170        69 
Benjamin Abraham
repurposes the tropes and practices of troll culture.
Yet despite all this, flarf for all its promise remains constrained in a number of significant 
ways by the larger Facebook regulatory context, with important structural features that 
preclude individual user responses on their own constituting a satisfactory response to 
hate speech on the platform. Specifically, when compared to the effects of public and 
advertiser pressure on Facebook to better implement and enforce its own community 
standards policies in public spaces, flarfing seems inadequate to this particular type of 
problem. And yet, even after significantly improving how Facebook enforces its community 
standards policy, gaps in Facebook’s regulatory regime leave responsibility for reporting 
and responding to individual hate speech utterances up to users.
The space between these constraints and the possible utility in employing user-led 
strategies like Facebook flarf leads me to affirm the perspective that finds that, in Banks 
(2010: 234) words, ‘a broad coalition of government, business and citizenry is likely to be 
most effective in reducing the harm caused by hate speech.’ How activists, researchers 
and users of social media sites can realise a more effective coalition of responses to hate 
speech lies beyond the scope of this paper, but if Facebook flarf is any indication, there 
will likely remain a role in any larger regulatory framework for the responsible actions of 
individual users and communities to challenge hate speech, enforcing the standards they 
wish to see online.
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